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1. Introduction
 
Modern economic analysis focuses on first principles and hence on
fundamentals (that is, on properties of technologies, preferences and
information structures) in order to simultaneously explain firms' perfor-
mances and market structures. 
Within this analytical framework, a superior technology coupled with
market rules that better determine the incentives to adopt it will result in
higher performance, at both micro and macro level.  Co-ordination
problems are supposed to be solved 
 
ex ante
 
 by an invisible hand or by
strategic interaction between economic agents.  This puts the weight of the
firms’ (and of the economy’s) performances on the intrinsic character of
technology and the prevailing institutions.  However, the contradictory
performance of the so-called ‘new economy’, which it was thought would
enable a great jump forward, has cast doubts on the alleged role of certain
technologies and institutional frameworks as a major factor of economic
growth.  This shifts the focus on the co-ordination mechanisms required to
make the innovation process which firm performance and hence the
growth of the economy actually depend, more viable.  Although there is
strong evidence that technical and market conditions have changed greatly
with the emergence of new technologies, it should be remembered that
the same basic co-ordination problems remain to be solved in the context
of the new economy.
Economies of the new age, like those of the older era, experience
biased technological progress, characterised, with reference to a Neo-
Austrian analytical framework (Hicks, 1973), by an increase in the
construction costs of the productive capacity which is more than
compensated for by a decrease in its utilisation costs
 
1
 
. 
In particular, innovation results in a breaking down of the time structure
of the existing productive capacity, which induces the appearance of co-
ordination problems both at firm and industry level.  In a restructuring
process costs and proceeds are no longer synchronised, and hence supply
and demand are also no longer equal at each moment of time and over
time.  Reactions to these imbalances result in fluctuations that may be a
threat to the viability of the innovation process.  How these co-ordination
problems are dealt with is what actually determines the performance of
the firm.  The market is also affected by this process.  The viability of
innovation processes cannot be dissociated from the way that market
structures emerge and evolve.
 
1. Clearly, information and communication technologies (ICT) tend to increase the capacity of
the economy to deal with variety.  “This has led to decreases in the cost of switching from one series
to another, from one product to another” (Zuscovitch, 1998: 252), that is, to decreases in the
utilization costs of a larger gamut of products and services.  However “this tendency calls for a
massive incorporation of science and technology in specific configurations to match this specified
variety”, which generally involves higher construction costs.
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Building on the insights in the Marshallian and the Schumpeterian
approaches we focus on the co-ordination role that markets and
organisations are called on to play in order to make the innovation process
viable.  We interpret competition as the main co-ordination mechanism
involved in this process and argue that competition can not only co-exist
with increasing returns, but helps firms to capture them.  We will show
that a stabilisation of the market structure, not just a particular feature of
it, is required for successful innovation (and returns to be realised).
However, competition may, or may not, lead to stabilisation.  It is really
successful when prices and quantity adjustments are carried out, which
make it possible for firms to obtain normal profits, that is, when these
adjustments do not result in a waste of productive resources.
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 analyses the nature of co-
ordination problems involved by innovation processes.  Section 3 provides
a model that allows these problems to be analysed.  Section 4 describes,
by means of simulations, the behaviour of the model, and presents the
main results.  Section 5 concludes with some analytical and policy
considerations.
 
2. Innovation and Sunk Costs: the Nature of Co-ordination Issues
 
According to the standard approach, technology is given, in that it has
an already defined specific character.  Innovation is then reduced to the
decision to adopt new technologies, with which given results are
associated.  According to our approach, innovation is a process of
research and learning that may, or may not, result in the appearance of
new productive options and new productive structures.  In this sense it is
a process of ‘creation of technology’, which, when (and if) successfully
brought about, makes it possible to actually transform the potential
increasing returns of technology into growth and monetary gains for firms
and consumers.  This process implies the break up of the existing industrial
structure and the modification of market conditions, followed by a gradual
reshaping.
Co-ordination is required in the first place to re-establish the harmony
between construction and utilisation, disturbed by the structural modifica-
tion involved, so as to avoid strong imbalances between costs and proceeds
and between supply and demand of final output.  However, co-ordination
occurs not only at the individual firm level but also at the system level.  Most
innovations do not arise as the result of the independent actions of single
innovating firms, but are the result of new forms of co-ordination across
several heterogeneous firms.  There is interaction between co-ordination
of the production process and co-ordination between firms. 
Co-ordination problems mainly arise from the existence of sunk costs
associated with the restructuring of productive capacity.  The focus on
sunk costs and the two faces of the co-ordination problem involved are
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common to the New Industrial Organisation (NIO) approach, but the role
that we attribute to them is rather different.
In the NIO approach, sunk costs are construction (investment) costs,
“a fascinating aspect of (which) is their commitment value” (Tirole, 1988:
314).  This commitment refers to a multi-period context and represents a
credible threat, which is essential to the determination of market structure.
However, the sunk costs in turn depend on market structure and are
determined simultaneously with the latter.  This is because sunk costs are
determined once the market game that defines market equilibrium is
known.  Everything is defined following a backward induction process that
implies an analytically instantaneous determination of all the relevant
magnitudes.  Sutton’s (1991, 1998) version of NIO is less extreme: he
abandons the aim of identifying a unique equilibrium outcome in a given
multi-period context.  “Instead we admit some class of candidate models
(each of which may have one or more equilibria) and ask whether anything
can be said about the set of outcomes that can be supported as an
equilibrium of any candidate model” (Sutton, 1998: 6-7).  This set of
outcomes must satisfy two conditions: the viability condition— which
means that each firm covers its sunk cost over the multi-period domain—
and the stability condition— which allows a certain market structure to be
preserved.  Although essentially different our treatment of sunk costs has
some relation to Sutton’s analysis in its focus on viability and the market
structures compatible with it.
However, in our analysis, sunk costs are not only an expression of the
existence of investment costs, but also of the divorce between costs and
proceeds at each step in the evolution process triggered by the breaking
up of the intertemporal complementarity of the production process as a
result of the attempt to conduct innovation.  Intertemporal complementa-
rity is the main feature of a process of production that stresses the
relationship between the phases of construction and utilisation of produc-
tive capacity.  It is assured, by definition, in equilibrium.  When it is no
longer assured, costs are dissociated in time from proceeds and hence
become ‘sunk’ costs.  The characteristic of the sunk costs of investment in
a process, which implies a structural change, is that they will only be
recovered when (and if) the process itself is actually established.  This
involves not only taking account of the whole period of construction of the
new productive capacity— which is likely to have a considerable length as,
before construction in a proper sense, it implies experimenting, pilot plans,
and so forth— but going beyond that point, until the stream of receipts
from the new output has reached a certain size and the change has thus
proved viable.  The point to be emphasised here is that, in a context of
gradual reshaping, costs depend not only on current production, but also
on the length of construction of the new productive capacity, on the length
of utilisation of this capacity, and on the total volume of output produced
over successive periods (Alchian, 1959).  These are not data, but the
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results of the process itself.  When, for example, excess productive
capacities result in lower rates of utilisation and/or in production process-
es being scrapped, then there are changes in production costs, and hence
in viability conditions.  These changes actually express co-ordination
failures that emerge as a consequence of a break down in the intertempo-
ral complementarity of production processes.
Firms do not know 
 
ex ante
 
 whether it pays to innovate. 
Indeed the answer to this question for any single firm depends on the
choices made by other firms, and reality does not contain any provisions
for firms to test their policies before adopting them.  Thus there is little
reason to expect equilibrium policy configurations to arise.  Only the
course of events over time will determine and reveal what strategies are
the better ones.  (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 286)
From this perspective competition can no longer be considered as a
particular 
 
state of affairs.  
 
It is not only aimed at equalising supply and
demand in a given market and technological environment, but “has also to
adapt both structure and technology to the fresh opportunities created by
expanding markets” (Richardson, 1975: 353).  It must be viewed as 
 
a
process of
 
 
 
trial and error,
 
 an essential moment in which is the discovery of
information about the behaviour of competitors and customers (Hayek,
1937).  This behaviour has feed-back effects on what happens inside each
firm in terms of the relation between costs and proceeds, the relationship
on which the viability of the innovation process and the emergence of a
particular market structure eventually depends.
 
3. A Sequential Model
 
The course of events that characterises an innovation process is
analysed by means of a model derived from Amendola and Gaffard (1998),
which makes it possible to exhibit the time structure of production
processes and to sketch the sequential interaction of decisions in the
process of restructuring productive capacities. 
For each firm 
 
i
 
, the state variables are: 
 
x
 
i
 
(
 
t
 
)
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i
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)
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 the wage rate, 
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, the external financial
resources which depend on banking policy, 
 
η
 
i
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)
 
, the fraction of total real
stocks actually put back on the market.
x1
i t( )
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3.1. The structure of productive capacity
 
In each firm 
 
i
 
 production is carried out by means of processes of a
Neo-Austrian type.  An elementary process of production is defined by the
input vector:
 
; k = 1,.., 
 
n
 
c
 
 + 
 
n
 
u
 
whose elements represent the quantities of labour required in the
successive periods of phase of construction c (from 1 to 
 
n
 
c
 
) to phase of
utilisation 
 
u
 
 (from 
 
n
 
c
 
 + 1 to 
 
n
 
c
 
 + 
 
n
 
u
 
) of the productive capacity of
commodity j, so that:
 with ,..., nc and ,
..., nc + nu
and by the output vector:
 with ,..., nc and , ...,
nc + nu
At each given moment t the productive capacity of a commodity j by
firm i is represented by the intensity vector:
each element of which is a number of elementary production processes of
a particular age, either still in the construction phase or already in the
utilisation phase.
At each given moment of time the productive capacity of the firm i is
given by the vectors:
whose elements are the number of processes in construction, xic(t), and in
utilisation, xiu(t) referring to all the technologies in use ( ).
The productive capacity is subject to ageing and to modifications due
to investment and scrapping.  Scrapping of production processes u(t)
occurs when resource constraints are so stringent as not to allow all the
processes inherited from the past to be carried on.  An alternative to
scrapping is a partial use of the utilisation processes, which, however,
implies a cost, as we shall see when we consider the rate of utilisation of
existing productive capacity.  We assume that the firms choose a less than
full degree of utilisation to allow for an over-normal functioning of the
existing capacity to enable ‘capacity competition’ (see below).
In each period the level of activity (both investment and current
production) of each firm (or of the representative firm) depends on its
wage fund ωi(t), which is constrained by available financial resources Fi(t)
or, alternatively, by available human resources ψi(t) :
ωi(t) = min [Fi(t),wi(t)ψi(t)]
a ji ajki[ ]=
a ji a jic a jiu[ , ]= ajki a jic k 1=∀= ajki a jiu, k n
c 1+=∀=
b ji bjki[ ]= bjki 0 k 1=∀= bjki b ji , k n
c 1+=∀=
x ji t( ) x jic t( ) x jiu t( ),[ ]=
x
i t( ) xic t( ) xiu t( ),[ ]=
x x j
j
∑=
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3.2. Financial resources constraint
The available financial resources Fi(t) are:
Fi(t) = mi(t – 1) + hi(t – 1) + f i(t) – ci(t) 
where the internal financial resources are given by mi(t – 1) the money
proceeds from the sales of final output, the idle money balances
involuntarily accumulated in the past and ready for use are given by
hi(t – 1), the external financial resources by f i(t), and the take-out by ci(t),
which is the current resources withheld from the financing of production
(consumption by producers, transfers, and so forth).
Within the sequential setting considered prices are fixed within each
given period and can only change at the junction of one period with the
next one.  As a consequence money proceeds are given by:
mi(t) = min [pi(t)di(t),pi(t)si(t)]
Real stock changes ∆io(t) are substitutes for price changes, which
cannot take place within the period.  Excess supply results in an
accumulation of undesired stocks for the firm:
∆oi(t) = oi(t) – oi(t – 1) = max [0,si(t) – di(t)]
where si(t) and di(t) are current real supply and real demand (for the
different and successive technologies), respectively.
External financial resources are such that:
f i(t) = min [f is(t),f id(t)]
where  stands for the borrowing power of the firm, and  is the
demand for external financing resulting from the production and
investment decisions actually taken.  External financial constraints are
formally exogenous in the model.  Different financing scenarios, which
imply consideration of the relation between external finance and the
viability of innovation processes, can be explored. 
3.3. Human resources constraint
The available human resources depend on a natural growth rate of
population and on wage elasticity:
ψ(t) = (1 + g)tL(0)w(t)ϕ
where g is the natural growth rate, w the (industry average) wage rate, and
ϕ the wage elasticity of labour supply.
A general human constraint may appear to be due to insufficient
growth of the labour force.  When the human constraint is more stringent
than the financial constraint money balances are involuntarily accumulated:
hi(t) = max [0,mi(t – 1) + hi(t – 1) – ωi(t)]
f si t( ) f di t( )
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3.4. Aggregate demand and market share
The aggregate market demand, D, is determined as follows:
D(t) = (1 + g)D(t – 1)pθ(t), θ ≤ 0
where g is a given exogenously determined growth rate, and θ demand
price elasticity.
The average market price is given by:
The market shares are:  di(t) = δi(t)D(t) with 
that is, a firm's market share depends on the relation of its price to the
average market price in the preceding period.
With β less than one, more or less constant market shares obtain when
the prices charged by the firms are different.  This looks like a
Chamberlinian competition.  With β greater than one, on the other hand,
the firm which, at one moment, has the greater market share, has the
cumulative advantage which results in the exit of some other firms.  This
looks like a situation characterised by the increasing returns of adoption.
3.5. Investment and production decisions
The evolution of each firm is actually determined by the behaviour of
the decision variables, namely, the rate of start of new production
processes , the rate of utilisation of productive capacity τ i, the price
of final output pi(t), the wage rate wi(t), the ratio ki(t) of the external
financial resources f i(t) to the money proceeds from the sales of final
output mi(t) (i.e., the firm's borrowing power), and the scrapping rate
.
Each firm determines the rate of start up of production processes in
such a way that the productive capacity available n + tc periods later will
match expected demand:
p t( )
pi t( )si t( )
i
∑
s
i t( )
i
∑
-----------------------------=
δi t( )
δi t 1–( )
pi t 1–( )
--------------------  
  β
δi t 1–( )
pi t 1–( )
--------------------  
  β
i
∑
-----------------------------------=
x1
i t( )
uk
i t( )
x t( ) max 0,d
˜
i
t nc+( ) q˜ i t nc+( )–
τ
ib
n
c
+1
i t nc+( )
---------------------------------------------------=
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where , is the real demand expected by the firm i for the period
t+nc, computed by extrapolating the average growth rate of real demand
registered in previous periods and  is the output that will be
obtained from the productive capacity available at period t+nc, the
construction of which began before t , so that:
where  is the desired rate of utilisation of the productive capacity.
Different investment behaviours may be considered by introducing
more or less stringent limits to the variations of the desired rate of starts
from one period to the next: limits that represent more or less aggressive
investment behaviours.  In fact, firms take investment decisions based on
expected demand, but they also know that the volatility of investments is
a threat to their survival.  So the change in the rate (whether an increase
or a decrease) of start ups of new production processes from one period
to the next is bounded, which sets a limit to the ‘capacity competition’ that
would otherwise take place.  This kind of competition depends on the fact
that in a truly sequential context firms cannot predict the result of the
market game.  Thus, when they make investment decisions based on
expected demand, they discount increases in productivity resulting from
their own innovations, but not those realised by competitors.  This is likely
to bring about excess productive capacities with respect to existing
demand, and pushes competing firms into ‘capacity competition’ aimed at
stealing market share from one another.
Each firm determines current production by fixing the current rate of
utilisation of its productive capacity, , so as to adjust its current supply
to expected final demand :
  where  is such that: 
that is, expected final demand is made to depend on the firm’s past
revenue trends, and  are the stocks that the firm wants to keep.
d˜ i t nc+( )
q˜ i t nc+( )
q˜ i t nc+( ) τi bk+nci t nc+( )xk+nci t nc+( )
k=2
nu
∑=
τ
i
τˆ
i
dˆ
τˆ
i
t( ) min 1 d
ˆ
i
t( ) oi t 1–( ) odi t( )–[ ]–
bki xki t( )
k=1
n
c
+n
u
∑
-------------------------------------------------------------,= dˆ
pi t( )dˆ i t( ) m
i t 1–( )2
m
i t 2–( )
-----------------------=
od
i
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As a result of the production and investment decisions the actual wage
fund is given by  where  is the labour demand given
by:
where  are the elements of the vector , which allows the
consequences on the labour demand of a variation in the rate of utilisation
of the productive capacity to be taken account of:
with:   and: 
, where  is the labour required to maintain a
process of production idle.
3.6. Price and Wage Decisions
The price charged by each firm is determined as follows:
That is, it is determined in such a way as to cover the cost of
production when using the productive capacity, which is the expression of
the technology adopted, at the desired rate of utilisation of this productive
capacity.  This price is determined, step-by-step, with reference to the new
technology adopted each time, to the moment this first reaches the phase
of utilisation.  This is how each firm implements price competition.
This price can be adjusted as mentioned above in order to relax the
financial resource constraint:
, 0 ≤ σi ≤ 1
where  is the desired rate of start ups, and  is the rate of start up
constrained by the available financial resources.
It can also (and alternatively) be adjusted in reaction to the market
disequilibria perceived in the previous period:
ω
i t( ) wi t( )Λi t( )=
Λi t( ) Aki t( )xki t( )ρki t( )
k=1
n
c
+n
u
∑=
ρki ρ
i
ρi t( ) ρ1i t( ),..., ρnci t( ),... ρnc+nui t( ),[ ]=
ρki t( ) 1= k,1 k nc≤ ≤∀ ρki t( ) τi t( ) ζi 1 τi t( )–( )+=
k, nc 1 k nc nu+≤ ≤+∀ ζi
pi t( )
w t( ) aki ρki t( )
k=1
n
c
+n
u
∑
τ
i b t( )
n
c
+1
n
c
+n
u
∑
----------------------------------------=
pi t( ) pi t( ) σi+ x˜ 1
i t 1–( ) xˆ1i t 1–( )–[ ]a1i wi t 1–( )
dˆ i t( )
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------=
x˜1
i
xˆ1
i
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, 0 ≤ χi ≤ 1
Moreover changes in price from one period to the next are both
upward and downward bounded.
The wage rate is endogenous to the model, being determined by the
partially exogenous supply of labour and the endogenous demand for
labour.  Changes in the wage rates paid by each firm reflect the
disequilibria arising on the labour market, that is:
where vi is a reaction coefficient.
As already mentioned, firms are wage makers on local labour markets.
Each firm, through its wage policy, can relax the human resource
constraint.  Competition in the labour market implies that each firm
obtains a fraction of the labour supply ψ i, which depends on the relative
wage it pays to its workers:
  with 
With ε less than 1, the distribution of the labour supply across firms is
more or less constant while their wages are different.  With ε greater than
1, on the other hand, the firm which, at one moment, has the greater share
of labour supply, benefits from a kind of cumulative advantage, which
implies that more and more workers prefer to be hired by this firm
whatever the wages it pays. 
Competition between firms results in different, but converging wage
rates.
3.7. Banking Policy
External financial resources are such that:
where k stand for the borrowing power of each firm, and  is the
demand for external financing resulting from the production and
investment decisions actually taken.
External financial constraints are formally exogenous in the model.
Different financing scenarios, which imply consideration of the relation
between external finance and the viability of innovation processes, can be
pˆi t( ) pi t( ) χi+ d
i t 1–( ) si t 1–( )–[ ]
s
i t 1–( )
--------------------------------------------------=
w
i t( ) wi t 1–( )= 1 vi+ Λ
i t 1–( ) ψi t 1–( )–
ψi t 1–( )
------------------------------------------------
ψi t( ) φi t( )ψ t( )= φi t( ) φ
i t 1–( )wi t 1–( )[ ]ε
φi t 1–( )wi t 1–( )[ ]ε
i
∑
-------------------------------------------------------=
f i t( ) min k mi t 1–( ) f d i t( ),[ ]=
f d i t( )
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explored.  A specific value for k might express the opinion (and the
decisions) of financial markets and / or bankers.
3.8. Innovation, imitation, entry and exit
A firm can introduce a new technology by innovating or imitating.
Innovation means embarking on a process, which should enable a better
performance than possible by firms using older technologies.  Imitation
consists of copying prevailing best practice.  Probability distributions that
are independent from firm to firm, but in the same distribution generate
innovations as well as imitations for all firms and over all periods.
Market structure evolves endogenously.  On the one hand, as already
mentioned, price variations provoked by cost variations result in changes
in market share.  Any firm whose market share falls below a given
threshold (e.g. 1%), for whatever reason (too high price or lack of
resources), exits from the market, but only one firm can enter the market
in each period of time.
Entry is modelled as a random process, characterised by an
independent random variable new-entry which takes on the values 1 or 0
according to whether a new firm does or does not enter.  Effective entry
occurs with the probability:
Pr{new – entry} = π.[Γ(t)]
where Γ is the rate of industry excess demand calculated over a given
number of previous periods.
The size of a new entrant is equal to a targeted market share (e.g. 50%
of the existing excess demand at industry level).  This threshold may be
considered as the strength of the financial constraints that the new firm
must work within.
3.9. Firms' performance and market concentration
The performance of each firm is measured by its unit margins, whereby
a unit margin is defined, in each period, as the ratio of the difference
between the price (calculated as mentioned above) and the current unit
cost of output— obtained by dividing the total cost of production of the
amount of output obtained in that period by the same amount— to the
price itself:
 where: 
Unit margins on average equal to zero mean that firms realise normal
profits.  Unit margins will be negative at the beginning of any innovation
process, which is necessarily characterised by higher construction costs.
This illustrates the initial competitive disadvantage suffered by innovative
µi t( ) p
i t( ) ci t( )–
pi t( )
----------------------------= c
i t( ) w
i t( )Λi t( )
qi t( )
------------------------=
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firms.  On the other hand, negative unit margins may be indicative of
excess capacities, that is, of a lower degree of utilisation of productive
capacity with respect to desired levels, and vice-versa.
Market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index.
4. The Innovative Process
While standard models of oligopoly or monopolistic competition
generally deal with the degree of competition and the characteristics of
industrial structures as determined by given information and cost
conditions, our model is directed towards a dynamic process of rivalry
such as determined by changing costs and information conditions.  This
process may result in a waste of productive resources and no real
advantage for customers or, alternatively, may allow firms and/or
customers to benefit from increasing returns.  It can likewise result in a
very unstable market structure, or in a fairly stable structure.
Within this framework, the character of the shocks that occur in each
period is not important.  These shocks always come down to a demand
for new productive resources, which result in a productive structure that
allows the benefits of the change to be realised only if the co-ordination
problems raised by the shocks themselves are properly dealt with.
Let us consider a market in which two or more firms compete with one
another by innovating, whether at the same time or sequentially.
Technological changes are ‘forward biased’, in a sense similar, but not
equal to, the definition in Hicks (1973), that is, increasing construction
(labour) costs are more than compensated for by increasing output rates.
At the beginning of the experiment the firms considered have an equal
share of the market and face an aggregate final demand which is growing
at a given rate (5%). There are no biases in the functioning of the product
and labour markets (β = 1 and ε = 1).  Prices are determined with regard
to a structure of productive capacity (embodying the more recent
technology) capable of sustaining a steady state: in other words they are
fixed at a level that corresponds to the average long run unit cost
associated with the prevailing technology.  Cost changes, not automatically
reflected in prices, therefore have an immediate negative effect on unit
margins.  Finally, there are free entry and exit conditions.
We assume that innovation perturbs an industry that at the beginning
of the simulations is in equilibrium.  This means in particular that in each
firm the investment carried out is sufficient to retain consistency during the
construction and utilisation phases of productive capacity, and at the same
time that it is related to the investments of the other firms such that the
market structure remains stable.  A technological shock destroys both the
internal consistency of the capital structure of the firms involved and the
equilibrium among firms.  What happens within firms also affects relations
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among them, and vice-versa.  This means that investments will become
either insufficient or excessive in relation to those required to keep both
the internal and the external equilibrium of the firms’ productive capacity.
This reflects the existence (or not) of a resource constraint: a financial
constraint and/or a human resource constraint in our modelling.
Together with the prevailing price and wage change regimes and the
specific features of the environment (in particular, the original number of
firms in the market), this will determine the viability or not of the
adjustment process triggered by the shock considered. 
A strong resource constraint (whether financial or human) prevents
excess capacity competition between the incumbents from becoming too
strong, and hence favours the profitable entry of new firms, presumably
with the required funds, given that targeted market share is exogenously
determined.  With a limited number of firms at the beginning (N=2 in our
experiments) and a strong financial constraint (k=0.2)— figure 1— the
following entry-exit process is characterised by a concentration index that
decreases before it is stabilised.  Costs are diminishing, although through
fluctuations, which means that the productivity gains associated with the
new technologies are actually obtained.  Unit margins, necessarily negative
at the beginning of any innovation process which is characterised by higher
construction costs, converge towards a more or less normal level.  The
robustness of these results is attested to by the synthesis achieved by
multiple runs corresponding to different values of the randomly chosen
variables, which show an increase followed by stabilisation of the average
number of firms existing in the market, and an increase followed by a
decrease in the mean dispersion of market share (figure 2).
When the human resource constraint prevails over financial
constraints, this, holds only if the wage reaction coefficient is equal to zero,
or sufficiently low (ν=0.05), that is, when the scarcity of labour does not
bring about wide variations in wages (figure 3).  If the wage reaction
coefficient is too high, and this is coupled with too high wage elasticity in
the labour supply, a very unstable market structure prevents innovation
processes from being viable (figure 4).
This also holds whatever the initial number of firms.  In the case of an
initial atomistic structure (N=50), a shake out process takes place, which
results in a stable market structure.  Then the gains from innovation are
realised (figure 5).  Under specific co-ordination conditions, the industry
converges towards dynamic equilibrium.  This holds whatever the value of
β: when β >1, that is when increasing returns to adoption prevail, the only
change is that the number of firms that characterise dynamic equilibrium
will be smaller (figure 6).
On the other hand, with a small number of original incumbents (N=2),
weak external financial constraints (k=1) favouring investment on the part
of the incumbents themselves, make it difficult for new firms to enter and
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5. 
6. 
Number of Firms Herfindahl Index
Dispersion of Market Shares
x 10 -3
Labour Productivity
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0.1 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07
0.06 
0.05 
0.04
0.03 
0.02 
0.01
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
2.5
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
0 
– 0,5
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2
Number of Firms
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
25
20
15
10
5
0
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Patrick Musso
130
OFCE/June 2006
simultaneously results in a relatively strong instability in market share,
which is associated with an increase in the concentration index.  Costs and
unit margins fluctuate strongly.  There are actually no productivity gains
from innovations (figures 7).
However, when prices evolve together with current costs and hence
are volatile, despite the existence of resource constraints, strong
turbulence occurs which prevent the economy from being viable.  There is
a shake out process that does not necessarily result in the stabilised market
structure that would be associated with the capability of each firm to really
capture productivity gains (figure 8).  Nevertheless, within this latter price
regime, in the case of monopolistic competition (β <1), when the global
market is segmented between customers that do not react to changes in
firms’ prices , the market structure is stabilised and productivity gains
accrue.  This is because market shares are much less sensitive to price
gaps.  Price fluctuations do not disturb the demand profile and hence the
temporal structure of productive capacity (figure 9).  A form of market
power is beneficial.
To sum up.  Increasing returns— obtained in a context of sequential
competition where each firm at different moments of time introduce new
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products belonging to the same general market— allow only a transitory
competitive advantage.  Several heterogeneous firms can coexist in the
market, despite the existence of increasing returns, remaining
differentiated not so much because they supply differentiated goods, but
because they are at different stages in the production process life cycle.
The latter situation can be defined as a dynamic equilibrium.  This is a
situation in which competition causes “the rate of investment in product
development to rise or fall towards the level at which this investment yields
only a normal return” (Richardson, 1998: 172).  This is a situation in which
the prices charged by firms reflect decreasing average costs so as to allow
the benefits from innovation to also benefit consumers.  This is also a
situation in which stability of markets shares obtains: there are neither
significant new entries nor significant exits from the market. 
These considerations not only qualify as a dynamic equilibrium, but also
represent the competitive conditions consistent with increasing returns.
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5. Conclusion
What happens to the firms involved in innovation— what happens to
their cost performance and market shares, and hence what happens to the
market structure— has been looked at as a process sketched, step by
step, by sequentially interacting disequilibria.  What essentially matters is
the deformation of the structure of productive capacity of the different
firms involved, which will be amplified or dampened according to the
nature of the co-ordination mechanisms that prevail.  We tested the
conjecture that the possibility of being able to take real advantage of
innovations essentially depends on the ability of each firm to maintain a
productive capacity structure that sustains a quasi-steady state.  And this
depends in turn on the working of the market coordination mechanism.
The availability of productive resources, and the constraints that these
may impose on the production process, and the equilibrating (or
disequilibrating) role played by price and wage regimes, are the essential
elements of the co-ordination mechanism at work.
There is no ex ante optimal co-ordination mode.  It all depends on how
the ingredients mentioned above are combined along the way.  And this
depends in turn on the specific context within which co-ordination has to
be carried out (initial number of incumbent firms, entry and exit
conditions, and the like).
It follows that the success (or not) of the introduction of new
technologies and the emergence and evolution of given market structures
is not dependent on the properties of technology, but depends on the
capacity to coordinate the activities of the various firms participating in the
restructuring process, which results in a certain degree of stability in the
market structure.
Thus, technological advances do not determine the dynamics of the
number of firms.  On the contrary, these are identified only once a stable
market structure signals that viability conditions have been fulfilled.
Nevertheless, different market structures can emerge from the same kind
of innovation process, depending on the effective working of the
coordination mechanism.
The focus on the coordination of innovation seen as an essentially
economic process reveals that there is no ‘new economy’ problem related
to the specific character of particular technologies, namely, ICTs.  The true
reason why these are seen as a major factor of growth is that their
supposed flexibility is believed to remove obstacles to the working of the
market and eliminate the possibility of market failure (such as the existence
of increasing returns or the choice of non optimal scales of production),
thus making possible to establish full competition.  We have shown, in
contrast, that the more we let the market operate in a sense close to
Walrasian equilibrium (by assuming full price and wage flexibility, free
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entry, and the like) the less likely that it will be that viable innovation
processes will emerge and the benefits of technology will be reaped.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that these results corroborate those in
Arrow’s study devoted to a better understanding of the behaviour of the
economy in conditions of disequilibrium. 
In any state of disequilibrium, i.e. any situation in which supply does not
equal demand, … the economy will show evidences of monopoly and
monopsony.  These evidences will be the more intense, the greater the
disequilibrium… [This] suggests that the measurement of competitiveness
by the concentration ratio has to be interpreted carefully.  A degree of
concentration which would be perfectly compatible with a reasonable
degree of competition if the market were in equilibrium might easily fail to
be so compatible in the event of serious inequality between supply and
demand.  (Arrow, 1959: 48-49) 
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